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Abstract 
This research is a comparative study of the institutional effects of regulatory and compliance issues 
surrounding cloud computing in healthcare. Our focus is on health care organizations and the IT 
industry, and how these two important stakeholders interpret and apply the privacy and security rules 
from the U.S. and EU. As an institutional environment, healthcare is experiencing coercive, 
normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures on macro, meso and micro levels. International 
governments are seeking ways to build capacity in the cloud computing market, yet they are faced 
with difficult issues in relation to privacy and security of personal data. Our findings suggest that 
regulatory and compliance is being developed ‘in response to’ rather than ‘in anticipation of’ 
technical change. Normative pressures to encourage healthcare organizations to develop effective 
data protection and privacy policies to comply with new regulatory change are further complicated in 
an environment where cloud data may be transferred across different legal and regulatory 
jurisdictions. Our findings show that healthcare organizations and cloud providers need to work more 
closely together as business associates. However, translating HIPAA and EU rules and regulations 
into practice is thwarted by a lack of legal and regulatory knowledge, particularly in the smaller 
organizations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The emerging market of cloud computing poses fresh challenges for policy-makers, healthcare 
organizations and the IT industry, as health data and information is increasingly transferred across 
national or state borders where little consensus exists about which authorities have jurisdiction over 
cloud data (Wolf and Tobin, 2007). This study examines institutional effects of regulation and 
compliance governing the US and Europe on privacy and security of health data. Based on primary 
interview and secondary source data, the research reveals the complex challenges facing policy-
makers, health care organizations and cloud providers in adopting cloud computing in healthcare 
environments. As trans-Atlantic regulatory frameworks are developed to keep pace with the fast-
moving market in cloud computing, evidence from our data shows that health care organizations and 
cloud providers need to work together to meet stringent compliance rules to avoid penalties and 
reputational damage. Traditional sourcing relationships where the cloud provider merely acts as a 
‘conduit’ for personal data are now being replaced with more stringent demands to work with clients 
as partners or ‘business associates’ with shared responsibility and accountability for the privacy and 
security of sensitive health data (DHHS, 2012). Current institutional arrangements in the U.S and 
Europe which support isomorphic conditions to harmonize regulation and compliance across regions, 
countries and supra-national states are resisted by contrasting institutional logics about privacy and 
security of personal (health) data. 
 
The US government and European Union continue the drive towards cloud computing through the use 
of electronic health records (EHRs).Institutional analysis on the development, maintenance and 
stability of healthcare systems needs to be extended as new coercive, mimetic and normative 
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1983, Mizruchi and Fein, 1999) pressures point to further restructuring and 
even de-institutionalization of current healthcare practices. In this paper, we explore the emerging 
market of cloud computing within the institutional field of healthcare, focusing on policy-makers, 
health and IT professionals. As cloud computing enables the transfer of health data across national, 
regional or state borders, new pressures are placed upon governments, where little consensus exists 
about which authorities have jurisdiction over cloud data (Berry and Reisman, 2012).At the top of the 
agenda for challenges in cloud computing is privacy and security. One survey compared findings from 
the regions of Asia Pacific, Europe and North America on the impediments to adoption of cloud 
computing. It found that Europe was mostly concerned about privacy and security with over 80% of 
respondents rating these issues as ‘very serious’ (World Economic Forum and Accenture, 2009).  
 
Institutional arrangements for governing health data privacy and security differ between the U.S. and 
Europe. In the US, The Office for Civil Rights enforces the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, protects the privacy of individually identifiable health 
information. The HIPAA Security Rule sets national standards for the security of electronic protected 
health information and the confidentiality provisions of the Patient Safety Rule, which protects 
identifiable information being used to analyse patient safety events and improve patient safety.  In 
comparison, the EU has the Data Protection Directive which regulates the processing of personal data 
across 28 Member States. It is an important component of EU privacy and human rights law. The 
Directive was adopted to harmonize national provisions on the protection of individuals in the 
processing and free movement of personal data. In 2010, the European Commission adopted a 
Communication setting out a comprehensive approach on personnel data protection in the EU on how 
to address new challenges to the protection of personal data at EU level and continue to ensure a high 
level of data protection and the free flow of personal data. In 2012, a draft European General Data 
Protection Regulation was unveiled to supersede the Data Protection Directive. Data protection is 
enshrined in the Treaty on the functioning of the EU which observes that all citizens have the right to 
the protection of their personal data. A comprehensive revision of the current Data Protection 
Directive aimed to address key aspects of processing personal health data, to ensure privacy for 
patients, and to enable the EU to meet the other legitimate objectives in the Treaties, including a high 
level of health protection (European Commission, 2012a). Faced with emerging regulation and 
compliance Directives, laws, policies and practices from the US and Europe, we examine how 
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coercive institutional pressures to prevent health data infringements are acted upon by cloud providers 
seeking to adopt normative practices to protect personal privacy and security. We further explore 
mimetic pressures on healthcare organizations to introduce robust governance and compliance 
practices for controlling and processing cloud-based health data which mirrors other industries, such 
as financial services. As regulators attempt to keep pace with the fast-moving market in cloud 
computing, evidence from our data shows that health care organizations and IT providers are 
increasingly expected to work together to meet stringent compliance rules to avoid penalties and 
reputational damage. Our institutional approach, however, suggests a more nuanced understanding is 
needed as coercive regulatory laws and rules are likely to have unintended consequences as their 
interpretation and monitoring prove difficult as healthcare organizations and cloud providers navigate 
their way through an increasingly complex global regulatory and compliance environment. 
 
This paper is divided into four parts. First, we give a brief overview of some of the key differences in 
U.S. and EU policy on cloud computing. We note that while both regions support the development of 
cloud computing as a vehicle for promoting free trade, enhanced job opportunities and improvements 
in information and data management in healthcare, two distinct regulatory and policy approaches 
exist. Second, we discuss our conceptual approach using institutional theory as a lens to examine 
regulatory and compliance cloud computing challenges for the field of healthcare. Our focus is on two 
stakeholder groups: health care organizations and IT providers. Under existing and emerging trans-
Atlantic regulation, these groups will need to work more closely together to comply with increasingly 
stringent rules governing the cross-border transfer of health data. Third, we present our findings in the 
discussion section. We compare U.S. and EU regulatory and compliance frameworks governing 
privacy and security of health data in the cloud. We offer insights into the key challenges for health 
care organizations and cloud providers, and recommend areas for further research for the IS 
community. 
2. US and EU Cloud Computing Policy 
 
The global cloud policy and technology landscape is a complex assortment of different legal, 
regulatory and compliance frameworks and models. Despite calls for a ‘global marketplace for cloud 
computing’ different countries continue to develop and refine their policies on privacy and security, 
intellectual property, technology interoperability, legal harmonisation, free trade and ICT 
infrastructure.  Global revenues for cloud computing are forecast to grow from a $40.7 billion in 2011 
to $241 billion in 2020 (Ried at al, 2011). The market comprises software-as-a-service (SaaS), 
platform-as-a-service (PaaS), infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) and business processes-as-a-service 
(BpaaS). SaaS is by far the largest market growing from $21.2 billion in 2011 to an estimated $92.8 
billion in 2016. Cloud computing is the use of computing resources (hardware and software) that are 
delivered as a service (e.g. email) over a network (e.g. the Internet). The use of cloud computing in 
healthcare is particularly contentious since it entrusts remote services provided by IT firms with 
health data and information. 
 
Four types of cloud computing have emerged in recent years, with differing privacy and security 
considerations for health care organizations. The Public cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open 
use by the general public with major players including Amazon and Google. It may be owned, 
managed, and operated by a business, academic, or government organization, or a combination of 
these entities. It exists on the premises of the cloud provider. The Community cloud infrastructure is 
provisioned for exclusive use by a specific community of consumers from organizations that have 
shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations). It may 
be owned, managed, and operated by one or more of the organizations in the community, a third 
party, or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises. The Hybrid cloud 
infrastructure comprises two or more distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) 
that remain unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that 
enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load balancing between clouds). The 
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Private cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a single organization comprising 
multiple consumers (e.g., business units). It may be owned, managed, and operated by the 
organization, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises. This 
form of cloud computing is perceived as offering the most safeguards for health care organizations. 
 
In the U.S, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) supports the government in 
adopting cloud computing models to reduce costs and improve services. The Federal Cloud 
Computing Strategy describes this role as, ‘..a central one in defining and advancing standards, and 
collaborating with USG Agency CIOs, private sector experts, and international bodies to identify and 
reach consensus on cloud computing technology and standardization priorities.’ The NIST Cloud 
Computing program and initiative aims to develop a Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap 
complementary to U.S. government initiatives defined in the broader strategy. “Cloud computing is a 
model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction” (Mell and Grance, 2011).  
 
In the EU, the Commission presented a European cloud strategy in the form of a communication 
entitled, 'Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe' (European Commission, 2012a), in 
which it announced the intention to set up a European Cloud Partnership (ECP). Under the guidance 
of the Steering Board, the ECP brings together public authorities and industry consortia to advance 
the objectives of the strategy towards a digital single market for cloud computing. Cloud computing is 
described as an 'engine for growth'. However, there are calls for a common European regulatory 
framework, as the current fragmentation inhibits the development of a digital single market for cloud 
computing. This concerns data location, digital content and data protection laws that span many 
jurisdictions. The following priorities under two axes are recommended:- 1] Harmonisation measures: 
the Commission will draft a matrix of challenges to the adoption of cloud computing; 2] Acceleration 
measures: to reinforce a vision for this work with key performance targets against which it can 
measure its success. In addition, ‘concrete lighthouse proposals’ are suggested that show how cloud 
computing can help to solve major problems in areas of social affairs, growth and jobs, small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). One study estimates that cloud computing has the potential to create 1.5 
million jobs in Europe by 2015, with a turnover worldwide in 2010 of around €26 billion. Neelie 
Kroes, commissioner for the digital agenda, estimates the savings from cloud computing could be 
around €300 per person per year. Other estimates claim that expected gains could be around €600 
billion between 2015 and 2020.  Smaller businesses are expected to benefit with forecasted savings of 
some 10-20% in ICT, due to lower total costs of ownership (TCO) of using cloud computing 
(European Commission, 2012b). Like the US, the European Commission is making Cloud computing 
an important political priority. 
3. Conceptual Underpinnings 
 
As a concept and a practice, cloud computing in healthcare necessitates a wider macro, meso and 
micro level analysis, as environmental, organizational and individual inputs are all part of the mix. At 
the institutional environmental level, national and supranational governments are concerned to 
develop regulatory and compliance policies to encourage structural isomorphism, e.g. the need for all 
actors in the healthcare field to conform to a single archetype or structural model (Boxenbaum and 
Jonsson, 2008). All actors performing a similar function may reflect the same basic structural features 
in their organizational design. Conversely, organizational actors may embrace many diverse structural 
templates (Scott et al, 2000, 359). Currently, the international cloud computing market suggests the 
latter, where adoption and diffusion practices differ across nation states.  For example, Japan, 
Australia, the US and Europe, all have different legal and regulatory systems, with diffusion levels of 
cloud computing steadily increasing (Martin, 2012). However, different institutional arrangements 
and logics exist in regard to privacy and security of cloud data. Comparing the U.S. and Europe, two 
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distinct approaches to privacy and security are seen, with variations in regulative, normative and 
cultural cognitive structures, values, social norms, and interests (Scott, 2001). 
Institutional environments, arrangements and logics are becoming more complex in the U.S. and EU 
as outsourcing arrangements for cloud-based models increasingly conflate client and vendor 
responsibility and accountability (Marston et al, 2011,). Health data in the cloud may be transferred 
across national, regional/state borders. While the US has a national policy framework in the form of 
HIPAA, the EU comprises 28 Member States, each with their own national government and even 
regional policies covering health data. Within the EU, little consensus exists over which national 
authorities have jurisdiction over cloud data, with countries like Germany having very stringent health 
data laws and policies and other EU member states having less stringent rules. This is further 
complicated when health data is transferred outside the EU by an IT provider with data centres in 
various geographical locations. Industry standards pertaining to administrative, physical and technical 
safeguards for health data also vary across countries and organizations. These safeguards are 
enshrined in HIPAA regulation and the EU Data protection Directive with varying points of emphasis.  
As institutional actors make sense of new regulatory requirements, roles and responsibilities between 
healthcare organizations and IT providers are becoming more intertwined. An illustration is in cloud 
computing contracts where healthcare organizations are encouraged to treat IT providers as ‘Business 
Associates’ (BAs). HIPAA defines a business associate is “any organization or person working in 
association with or providing services to a covered entity who handles or discloses Personal Health 
Information (PHI) or Personal Health Records (PHI)” (DHHS, 2012). Examples are accounting or 
consulting firms who work in health care organizations, including clinical and non-clinical staff with 
access to PHIs or PHRs. Similarly in Europe, the demarcation is made between a data controller and a 
data processor. The data controller determines ‘who is responsible for compliance and data protection 
rules, and how data subjects can exercise the rights in practice’, e.g. to allocate responsibility. The 
data processor is, ‘the natural or legal person, public authority or agency or any other body that alone 
or jointly with others, processes personal data on behalf of the controller’ (European Commission, 
2012, 7-8). Adopting an institutionalist perspective, this paper is interested to observe how 
institutional environments, arrangements and logics effect the regulation of health data using cloud 
computing across the U.S and EU. Institutional concepts of coercive, mimetic and normative 
pressures offer a lens to examine how governments, healthcare organizations and IT providers make 
sense of regulatory regimes across field boundaries with different institutional structures and 
practices. We next discuss our data collection methods.  
3.1. Data collection methods 
 
The research study is a comparative analysis of U.S and EU regulation and compliance policy for 
cloud computing in healthcare. While there are many cross-field studies within institutional theory, 
there is a lack of cross-national studies, where different logics emanating from multiple macro, meso 
and micro levels may collide culminating in unintended consequences and outcomes. Our study 
addresses this gap within the institutional theory literature by providing insights on how Directives, 
laws and rules surrounding the emerging market of cloud computing are interpreted and applied in 
different countries and across regions/states. Our notion of field therefore extends beyond national 
borders by considering how emerging technology used within the healthcare domain is governed not 
simply by organizational strategies but by cross-jurisdictional laws and directives. So far, the 
technical development of cloud computing far out-strips the progress of the regulatory and 
compliance regime. However, concerns about privacy and security among health care organizations 
act as barriers for many healthcare organizations in moving heath data onto the cloud [Chow et al, 
2009]. Primary and secondary data was collected over a two year period. Semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with 28 health professionals (12 interviews with U.S. informants and 16 interviews 
with European informants) to gather data on regulatory and compliance challenges of cloud 
computing in health care organizations. In addition, 15 interviews were carried out with IT vendors 
who offer cloud computing products and services to the health sector. The interviews lasted around 55 
Health data in the cloud 
 
 
Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems 2014 5 
 
minutes. The broad research questions were: What is the regulatory framework for cloud computing in 
the US and Europe? and, How will healthcare organizations and the IT industry develop compliance 
policies and practices to meet these changes? 
 
In addition to primary interviews, secondary source data was collected and analysed from a range of 
government, IT industry, NGO and health care organizations (hospitals, patient groups and 
associations, among others). This information provides a valuable source of material on both the 
generic issues surround cloud computing and the specific issues facing health care organizations and 
the IT industry.  
4. Discussion and Analysis 
A comparative analysis of the U.S and EU regulation and compliance policies and practices in the 
context of cloud computing in healthcare reveals wide differences.  Distinct approaches to privacy and 
security are seen, with variations in values, social norms, and interests accounting for much of these 
differences. In the U.S, the concept or privacy is not written into the Constitution, so the right to 
privacy of the citizen is not wholly guaranteed. The history of privacy regulations in the U.S has 
focused around industry self-regulation and reactive legislation. The U.S approach is described as 
laissez-faire with markets setting the agenda, and governments intervening only when the private 
sector falls short. By contrast, the EU has proactively regulated the use of personal data, where the 
state is seen as playing an important role in protecting the rights of citizens’ privacy and security. By 
extension, the EU requires close participation between business and government in discussing 
regulatory and compliance issues with the interests of the citizen at the centre. The right to privacy is 
seen more as a human right, with the governments of many EU countries embedding privacy in their 
Constitutions (e.g. Germany and Spain), and more widely in the Council of Europe’s Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Treaty to establish a Constitution 
for Europe further states the importance of strengthening the protection of fundamental rights 
following social and technological changes (Movius and Krup, 2009). 
Our data highlights different approaches towards regulation and compliance by the U.S and EU. 
Institutional arrangements and logics on how health organizations and IT providers interpret and 
implement laws and rules suggest a lack of harmonization, particularly in the area of health data 
privacy and security. We discuss the two distinct approaches in more detail. 
4.1 US Regulation and Compliance 
 
The U.S. government promotes health IT as part of the HITECH Act (Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health) of 2009. The government pledged a $787 billion stimulus package 
to develop electronic health records (EHRs) for healthcare. One element of the Act was to ensure that 
healthcare organizations would work more closely with IT providers, not simply as part of a client-
provider split, but as partners. So under the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996, a HIPAA business associate agreement (BAA) is a type of outsourcing contract between a 
HIPAA covered entity and a HIPAA business associate (BA). The contract protects personal health 
information (PHI) in accordance with the guidelines. Since 2010, outlined in the HITECH Act, a BA's 
disclosure, handling and use of PHI must comply with HIPAA Security Rule and HIPAA Privacy 
Rule mandates. A BA that serves a health care provider or institution is now subject to audits by the 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within the Department of Health and Human Services and can be held 
accountable for a data breach and penalized for non-compliance. These new regulations force the BA 
to explicitly state how they will report and respond to a data breach, including data breaches resulting 
from  a BA’s subcontractors. Also, BA’s are required to show how they will respond to an OCR 
investigation. 
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A recent case saw the United States Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS) Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR) agreeing a $100,000 monetary settlement with Phoenix Cardiac Surgery, P.C. 
(PCS) alleging various violations of the HIPAA privacy and security rules.  Violations included a 
failure to: implement adequate policies and procedures to appropriately safeguard patient information; 
document that it trained any employees on its policies and procedures on the Privacy and Security 
Rules; identify a security official and conduct a risk analysis; and obtain business associate 
agreements with Internet-based email and calendar services where the provision of the service 
included storage of and access to its ePHI. The PCS settlement followed an extensive three-year 
investigation, stemming from allegations that PCS posted patients’ clinical and surgical appointments 
on a publicly accessible Internet-based calendar.  It was also alleged that PCS transmitted electronic 
PHI from an Internet-based email account to employees’ personal Internet-based email accounts. In 
addition to the financial settlement, PCS will implement a corrective action plan that includes a 
review of recently developed policies and other actions taken to come into full compliance with the 
Privacy and Security Rules. The OCR which has HIPAA enforcement authority offered a public 
statement about the Phoenix Cardiac Surgery case:  “If you use a cloud service, it should be your 
business associate. If they refuse to sign a business associate agreement, don't use the cloud service.” 
Reporting of violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule is invited by the US Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS)…..” If you believe that a covered entity violated your (or someone else’s) 
health information privacy rights or committed another violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, you 
may file a HIPAA Privacy Rule Complaint with OCR”. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule extends beyond the large health care organization to encapsulate small 
GP/physician practices with access to PHI. Patients are encouraged to be vigilant about protecting 
their health data, so mechanisms to report violations if they feel their privacy is being breached are in 
place. Physicians are not exempt from responsibility so they need to understand how if using their 
personal email (e.g. Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail or AOL account for office business) complies with the 
privacy and security rules. Since physicians often work in a mobile capacity using their hand-held 
devices (e.g. mobile phones), it is the potential for violations are increased (e.g. using personal email 
to sign off patients, discuss appointments, test results, etc). Within the HIPAA rules, non-secured 
email services for transferring patient health data amount to violations. 
From our interview data with US physicians, concerns were raised about the lack of awareness about 
HIPAA. One physician claimed, “The HIPAA rules have been brought in over the past few years and 
we, as a profession, have to comply or face heavy penalties. We need to work with our IT vendors as 
partners and not just buy a cloud service and think we can carry on as business-as-usual”. 
Interviews with cloud service providers suggested that some were confused about their role as BAs, 
since they perceived their role more as a conduit for health data to be stored or transferred through 
their data center.  However, the updated HIPAA Privacy and Security rules released in 2013, reject 
this view if the cloud vendor maintains protected health information in their cloud data center. Thus, 
“an entity that maintains protected health information on behalf of a covered entity is a business 
associate and not a conduit, even if the entity does not actually view the protected health 
information...a data storage company that has access to protected health information (whether digital 
or hard copy) qualifies as a business associate, even if the entity does not view the information or only 
does so on a random or infrequent basis. …To help clarify this point, we have modified the definition 
of “business associate” to generally provide that a business associate includes a person who “creates, 
receives, maintains, or transmits” (emphasis added) protected health information on behalf of a 
covered entity. (Federal Register  25-26). 
For cloud providers, the HIPAA regulations impose stringent penalties and fines for non-compliance 
which cascade down to other firms acting as sub-contractors. A central issue for cloud providers, not 
just in the U.S, but internationally, is that platforms, infrastructure, business processes, and 
applications will all need to comply with privacy and security rules concerning the storage and 
transfer of health data. For example, cloud services for EHRs will be constrained by federal regulatory 
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legislation and oversight (Schweitzer, 2013, p.161).While the U.S. has traditionally seen privacy 
rights falling within self-regulation and governance, the potential for cloud computing in healthcare to 
span many jurisdictions will necessitate the need to harmonize or at least co-operate with differing 
legal and regulatory systems. 
4.2 EU Regulation and Compliance 
The EU Data Privacy Directive develops standards which the 27 Member States must embed into 
their own national data privacy and security laws. These standards apply when either a company or 
individual collects health data on an EU citizen. The EU directive has far-reaching international 
implications. For example, US health organizations must comply with the Directive if they collect 
health data on EU citizens (Berry and Reisman, 2012). Since cloud computing is likely to involve the 
cross-border transfer of health data, the Commission has concerns that some U.S. IT vendors who 
control this data may not meet the regulative and legal requirements set out in the Directive. The EU 
prohibits the export of personal (health) data unless the importing country ‘ensures an adequate level 
of protection’ (Wolf and Tobin, 2007). The U.S. is not currently among the nine countries that have 
been recognized. However, the EU and U.S. have developed a compromise, called the ‘Safe Harbor’ 
provision. This enables the U.S. to voluntarily self-certify that they meet the requirements of the 
Directive. This allows U.S. firms to qualify individually even though the country, as a whole, does not 
qualify.  
Within the EU more generally, the Data Privacy Directive intends that a uniform standard of data 
protection is in place throughout the EU. In practice, however, variation exists in how the 28 Member 
States interpret and implement the Directive. In Germany, for example, many healthcare organizations 
do not permit health data to be stored outside the physical premises, making cloud computing a non-
viable option. In other EU countries, notably, the U.K. the development of a national program for 
EHRs has been met with serious resistance, from clinicians and their representative bodies, 
particularly as fears about access rights and transfer of electronic patient data is viewed as a potential 
threat to patient security and confidentiality (Currie, 2012). 
Proposals to alter the EU data protection rules have been questioned by leading medical bodies, such 
as the British Medical Association (BMA). Doctors fear that changes could put existing patient 
confidentiality safeguards at risk. Draft proposals on the processing and free movement of personal 
information suggest that identifiable health data could be used for research without patient consent. 
The BMA is concerned that the provisions will remove current patient confidentiality safeguards and 
allow identifiable health data to be used without consent for historical, statistical or scientific research 
purposes when anonymized or pseudonymized data cannot be used. Although the regulation states 
that data that could reveal identities must be segregated, greater clarification is needed about whether 
this could be on separate databases, or transferred outside the organizations where it was initially 
stored. An interview with one UK-based senior doctor stressed, “The problem with the current 
regulatory regime concerning health data privacy and security is that legislation and policy is not in 
line with medical and technical progress. Politicians and legislators are trying to keep up with 
advances in medicine, such as genome mapping and developments in IT, such as cloud computing. 
Unfortunately, we are now seeing a patch-work quilt of different and incompatible rules and 
regulations, with mixed messages about incentives and penalties for compliance and non-
compliance’. 
BMA’s Director General said, ‘The BMA has serious concerns that Article 83 appears to permit the 
processing of health data, in identifiable form, for research purposes without any reference to 
consent…The only safeguards which appear in the clause seem to be that identifiable data must be 
kept separate, and researchers can use (it) only if research cannot be fulfilled by using non-identifiable 
data. This seems to be significantly lower than the existing standard for protection of health data’ 
(BMA, 2012). The BMA, however, recognizes the EU Directive needs to be updated given the 
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technological advances and changes to consent provisions. The proposal to shorten the time data 
controllers have to respond to subject access requests from 40 days to 30 days will be an 
administrative burden. Clarity is therefore needed over whether GP practices and clinical 
commissioning groups could be fined if records are not provided in a portable electronic format to 
patients. Coercive pressures to improve the process of subject access requests will have significant 
implications for health care organizations and cloud providers, not least because the punitive action 
may be taken if regulators discover infringements in relation to how patient records are stored and 
transferred.  
 
4.3 Institutional effects of regulating health data in the cloud 
 
The institutional effects of regulating health data in the cloud are inherently complex as trans-border 
data flows encounter different institutional environments, arrangements and logics. U.S. and EU 
policy-makers and legislators support the move towards cloud computing as a potential means of 
improving health service delivery, yet the coercive, mimetic and normative pressures governing 
health data vary widely. While the U.S. is less concerned with privacy as a human right, compared 
with the EU, the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules impose serious penalties and fines for violations 
and breaches, such as the case of Phoenix Cardiac Surgery discussed above. These coercive pressures 
are likely to produce mixed outcomes. Healthcare organizations engaging in normative behaviors to 
improve their professional practices are likely to increase legitimization of how health data is 
governed. This may encourage other healthcare organizations to mimic these organizations, 
suggesting isomorphic change in line with the requirements of the regulator. However, these coercive, 
normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures may slow the pace of cloud computing in healthcare, 
where penalties and sanctions result in reputational damage for healthcare organizations and IT 
providers. 
 
An example is found in the EU where the Commission recently launched an investigation against 
Google over allegations that it is abusing users’ personal data (Doyle, 2013). Within the EU there are 
six data protection regulators. An investigation was launched by 29 European agencies to examine 
Google’s decision to pool anonymous data across Google services, which may benefit the company in 
selling online advertisements. Google and other large internet firms like Facebook provide free 
services to consumers and earn revenues from selling ads which they claim are targeted to individual 
interests unlike the more traditional approaches used in television and radio. While this investigation 
is about the broader issue of users’ personal data, the implications for cloud providers working with 
healthcare organizations are significant. Yet coercive pressures by the EU to force multi-national 
companies to adhere to stringent regulations are made more challenging due to the lack of 
international harmonization of regulatory and legal systems. Regulators are therefore ‘behind the 
curve’ of the business and IT strategies of large firms so exercising laws and rules is more likely to be 
effective with the smaller players. 
 
Within the institutional environment, the various trans-Atlantic regulatory and compliance 
approaches, such as, the EU Data Privacy Directive, EU Model Clauses, EU Safe Harbor, ISO 27001 
(International Organization for Standardization), the U.S. FISMA (Federal Information Security 
Management Act), HIPAA, Business Associate Agreements (BAAs) Data Processing Agreements, 
and binding corporate rules (BCRs) all attract support and criticism from the communities they serve. 
Conflicting institutional arrangements and logics exist within the international healthcare field. One 
area which is being tackled by the regulator is about access the health data. One question surrounding 
cloud computing is: who has access to health data?  In the EU, the notion of model contract clauses 
and binding corporate rules (BCRs) as institutional mechanisms for processing personal data in the 
cloud is contentious, not least because these arrangements do not prohibit U.S. law enforcement 
bodies from gaining access to this data. A report, ordered by the European Parliament's Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) (European Commission, 2012c), claimed that the 
EU had created "derogations" from traditional rules governing international transfers of personal data, 
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which, in the context of cloud computing, could not adequately protect the privacy of the  data. The 
BCRs and model contract clauses were examples of the 'derogations' created and that both are were 
‘equally unsuitable to prevent the use of cloud data for surveillance purposes’. It said the EU had 
made ‘errors’ when forging an agreement with the US over the recognition of U.S. organisations' data 
protection standards.  
 
The terms of the EU's 'Safe Harbor' agreement with the U.S. mean that the EU cannot control who can 
access EU citizens' personal data once it has been uploaded to cloud servers. The existing derogations 
must be dis-applied for Cloud due to the systemic risk of loss of data sovereignty. It stressed the EU 
should enter into fresh negotiations with the U.S. for the recognition of a human right to privacy 
where Europeans are granted equal protections in U.S. courts. The US-EU Safe Harbor agreement 
allows for such data transfers where data protections meet EU standards. U.S. organizations that 
conform to requirements of the scheme are believed to have satisfied European safety standards 
outlined in the Data Protection Directive. Under this Directive companies are prohibited from sending 
personal data outside of the European Economic Area (EEA) unless robust protections have been put 
in place, or where the destination country has been designated as possessing adequate data protection. 
 
For countries outside the EEA, labelled as ‘third’ countries, a company needs to show that robust 
protections are in place, which means the data is given the same protection under EU laws. The report 
claims that U.S. authorities could ‘lawfully’ obtain access to EU citizens' personal data on cloud 
servers under the terms of the U.S. Patriot Act or U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment 
(FISA) Act. This means the EU's exclusive sovereignty over the data is lost once it transfers onto 
cloud servers. Such a move reduces the impact of BCRs and model contract clauses. The report 
stresses that planned revisions to the EU's data protection law framework should include rules 
governing ‘law enforcement cooperation with the private sector’. It recommends the European 
Parliament develops a revised framework where companies give ‘prominent warnings to individual 
data subjects’ to inform them that EU cloud data could be ‘exported to US jurisdiction’. 
 
Our findings suggest the institutional field of healthcare is a complex array of existing and emerging 
privacy and security regulations. At the level of the health care organization, negotiations with cloud 
providers need to address the how health data will be governed if it is transferred across legal and 
regulatory different jurisdictions. Our interviews with cloud providers uncovered a range of issues 
about the importance of complying with current U.S. and EU privacy and security rules, but also 
concerns about possible violations and sanctions. One cloud provider commented, “My company 
offers cloud services for EHRs. We are now moving to the cloud but apart from using an outsourced 
legal team, we are not fully aware of all the rules and regulations. The lawyers are going to make a 
lot of money out of the cloud computing industry…..but the penalties for data violations will be met by 
the client and possibly the IT vendor. More education is needed about this space as regulations are 
being developed in an adhoc way” (SME IT provider, London, UK). 
While U.S. HIPAA regulation seeks to expose those who do not fully comply with privacy and 
security rules, the E.U. under the Article 29 Working Party, formed an opinion that EU organizations 
using cloud computing to store and process personal data must use cloud providers that can 
‘guarantee’ compliance with EU data protection laws. It cautions against cloud providers' "self-
certification" suggesting they comply with U.S-EU Safe Harbor standards, which may not fully 
comply with EU data protection laws. For example, cloud providers that operate as either a 'platform-
as-a-service' (PaaS) or 'software-as-a-service' (SaaS) may not meet the privacy principles on which 
Safe Harbour is founded since they are largely ‘conduits’ of data or data processors. Data processors 
that obtain BCRs are challenged by similar constraints over the privacy protections they claim when 
processing health data in the cloud. Yet the use of auditing schemes to review cloud providers' data 
protection standards does not resolve those constraints. Safe Harbour for processors is a problematic 
concept (because a IaaS/PaaS Cloud cannot by definition fulfil any of the Safe Harbour Agreement 
Principles). Further, BCRs for processors may not guarantee that sensitive data will not be accessed 
by governments in other jurisdictions. 
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Despite the attempts by the E.U to recommend robust audit procedures to ensure cloud services are 
compliant, there currently exists no reliable commercial audit methodology that can fully protect 
personal or health data. Once data is transferred to the cloud, it is difficult for healthcare organizations 
to uncover covert surveillance whether this is 'lawful' under the national security rubric of a third 
country (especially if that audit is conducted by a company from that country). So the notion of a Data 
Processing Agreement being able to cover this scenario is not possible, particularly if the Cloud 
provider operates outside the EU jurisdiction. The European Commission has now developed new 
model contract terms for organizations who wish to enter into contracts and service level agreements 
with cloud providers. 
Other areas which fall within the regulatory and compliance arena are on-demand (24/7) access to 
health data. The so-called ‘anytime, any place, anywhere’ promise of data access is an important 
market logic for cloud computing, particularly where easy access to patient data may be required in an 
emergency scenario. Normative pressures for IT vendors to embed into their cloud offerings a range 
of regulative and compliance measures, including, the Data Processing Agreement, EU Model 
Clauses, EU Safe Harbor, HIPAA, with Business Associate Agreement (BAA), FISMA (Federal 
Information Security Management Act), and ISO 27001 (International Organization for 
Standardization) are all examples of coercive pressures. However, institutional arrangements across 
national states differ in relation to standards. Healthcare organizations may unwittingly enter into 
agreements with cloud providers who are unable to demonstrate they have stringent policies which 
adhere to industry standards. Normative pressures about which standards to adopt are likely to 
confuse smaller cloud providers, particularly where they lack the legal awareness to evaluate their 
rights and responsibilities in controlling and processing health data in the cloud. 
Ethical uses of health data are a further factor which is becoming increasingly important. How health 
data is governed extends beyond the technical remit to include potential commercial exploitation and 
use of personal data. The likelihood of ‘data mingling’ (where health data is sent through a public 
cloud, where data co-mingles with other companies’ data) may occur. This is reduced in the private 
cloud where there is no shared infrastructure and less risk of data co-mingling with other entities. 
5.  Conclusion 
This research is a comparative study of the institutional effects of regulatory and compliance issues 
surrounding cloud computing in healthcare. Our focus is on health care organizations and the IT 
industry, and how these two important stakeholders interpret and apply the privacy and security rules 
from the U.S. and EU. As an institutional environment, healthcare is experiencing coercive, normative 
and mimetic isomorphic pressures on macro, meso and micro levels. International governments are 
seeking ways to build capacity in the cloud computing market, yet they are faced with difficult issues 
in relation to privacy and security of personal data (Venters and Whitley, 2012). Our findings suggest 
that regulatory and compliance is being developed ‘in response to’ rather than ‘in anticipation of’ 
technical change. Normative pressures to encourage healthcare organizations to develop effective data 
protection and privacy policies to comply with new regulatory change are complicated in an 
environment where cloud data may be transferred across different legal and regulatory jurisdictions. 
Healthcare organizations and cloud providers are encouraged to work together as business associates, 
although translating HIPAA and EU rules and regulations into practice is thwarted by a lack of legal 
and regulatory knowledge, particularly in the smaller organizations. At the micro level, the notion that 
citizens should be made fully aware if their sensitive health data is exposed to the ‘surveillance 
apparatus’ of another country is shared by many, yet guaranteed by few, as key stakeholders (e.g. 
policy-makers, health professionals, IT firms) negotiate cloud policy and implementation.  
The issues surrounding cloud computing in healthcare are complex and challenging, particularly as 
health care organizations, who may have low competencies in IT (compared with other sectors like 
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finance) now seek to enter into contracts with cloud providers. Our findings support a more nuanced 
approach embracing comparative research on regulatory measures from HIPAA in the U.S. to the 
Data Protection Directive in the EU. These regulations developed at the country and pan-European 
levels respectively present policy-makers with serious challenges where sensitive health data is 
transferred across organizational, state (regional) and country boundaries. While leading IT firms, 
such as Microsoft, have developed their Windows 365 to be HIPAA compliant, healthcare 
organizations face potential threats if they use cloud services from non-HIPAA compliant vendors. 
Stringent privacy and security rules underpinning this legislation pose further challenges as any 
healthcare organization using an external IT provider must now ascertain whether all sub-contracted 
parties also comply. Since this is a relatively new development in outsourced IT contracts (e.g. using 
cloud services for email and document management) the regulation now assumes that cloud providers 
can no longer be mere ‘conduits’ of health data, but are in fact, business associates, subject to the 
same compliance rules as their clients. Findings from this research, however, suggest that 
competencies and know-how about the intersection between regulation and compliance for cloud 
computing in healthcare remain low. Hospital IT staff are generally trained in negotiating outsourcing 
contracts with local or national suppliers, yet their knowledge of national, pan-European or even 
trans-Atlantic legal and regulatory frameworks for cloud computing is limited. Signing a standard IT 
outsourcing contract is therefore risky, particularly as the cloud provider may also demonstrate 
limited awareness of the requirements outlined in either HIPAA or EU data privacy laws.  
In summary, the institutional effects of comparative government regulation for the protection and 
privacy of health data in the cloud extends beyond the business, organizational and technical domain 
(Marston et al, 2001; Sultan, 2013). Since cloud computing spans multiple disciplines and industry 
sectors, research into this field needs to consider, not just the IT artefact, but also, how clients of 
cloud services enter into agreements with cloud providers where stringent regulatory and compliance 
obligations govern not just the success or failure of delivery a cloud-based business process or 
service, but whether such a contract will ultimately violate U.S. or EU privacy and security laws. 
Despite data protection policies starting out as general statements, their interpretation and application 
also depends on the institutional social norms, culture and values of a country or even professional 
group. Understanding how different countries adopt cloud solutions is an interesting research 
challenge for the IS community. Equally, how different professional groups move to the cloud is also 
illuminating. Within healthcare, the promise of technology to improve health service delivery is met 
with fresh opportunities, given the burgeoning health IT sector, but also serious barriers, as health 
professionals grapple with the complex arena of new medical devices, applications and infrastructure. 
This study offers a high level analysis and suggests the need for more cross-national IS research 
which considers how emerging technologies, such as cloud computing is adopted by healthcare 
organizations in a global regulatory environment. It also offers a cautionary note to practitioners, who 
are keen to develop and sell their health IT solutions, albeit now in an environment where privacy and 
security issues surrounding health data possibly outweigh other considerations such as cost reduction. 
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